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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Joanna Gomula*
INTRODUCTION
The caseload of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been
significant since the Court's foundation almost fifty years ago, and has
increased considerably in recent times. However, when assessing the
Court's contribution to the development of international law one
should look beyond its caseload of interstate disputes. Through its
advisory activity, based on Article 65 of the ICJ Statute and Article 96
of the United Nations Charter, the Court has played a very important
role in enhancing the significance of law not only in relations between
States, but also in relations between international organizations.1
Through its advisory opinions, the Court has developed and strength-
ened concepts. governing the functioning of international organiza-
tions, sanctioned the expansion of the scope and objectives of these
organizations, and confirmed their important position in international
relations.
While history is probably largely responsible for the Court's role in
advancing the theory of international organizations, in the past two
decades a phenomenon well exceeding the Court's statutory limits has
affected the Court's advisory jurisdiction. In expanding the structural
boundaries of international organizations, the Court has drawn itself
* Senior Assistant, Polish Academy of Sciences (since 1988). Magister in Law, Warsaw
University (1983); Magister in Administration, Warsaw University (1983); Doctoral Program,
Institute of State and Law, Polish Academy of Sciences (since 1984); LL.M., University of Mich-
igan Law School (1991).
1. Statute of the International Court of Justice (annexed to the Charter of the United Na-
tions, June 26, 1945), art. 65, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1055 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945), reprinted in
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STATUTES AND RULES OF COURT AND OTHER CONsTI-
TUTIONAL DOCUMENTS (Series D, Acts and documents concerning the organization of the
court, no. 1, 2d ed. 1947):
The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever
body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to
make such a request.
U.N. Charter Article 96 provides:
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialised agencies, which may at any time be
so authorised by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on
legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.
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into an activity not foreseen by the instruments governing its function-
ing, namely the review of decisions of administrative tribunals, which
are the internal2 judicial or semijudicial organs of international organi-
zations. Provisions that allow reference to the ICJ on judgments of
two administrative tribunals of international organizations3 amount in
fact to an appeals procedure. Needless to say, by accepting such a
procedure, the Court has expanded its own powers. Interestingly, this
expansion has involved the application of the implied powers doctrine4
to the Court itself rather than to an international organization. To
date, the ICJ has answered four requests for advisory opinions involv-
ing the expansion of the Court's power of review.'
This paper will explore the origins of the Court's unusual system of
review and underscore some of its problems. Surprisingly, this issue
has not been adequately expounded, 6 although occasionally different
authors have discussed particular problems, such as the participation
of individuals in proceedings before the Court.7
An overview of the nature of administrative tribunals and their
position in the structure of international organizations will precede the
analysis of the procedural aspects of the Court's activity as an appeals
tribunal. This background is important because of the ICJ's signifi-
cant contribution to the evolution of administrative tribunals. One
can risk a hypothesis that the Court has become a prisoner of its own
2. The term "internal" is used narrowly to refer to relations within an organization, and
more broadly to any organ, including the ICJ, which is an "internal" organ of an international
organization.
3. The two tribunals are the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) and the Ad-
ministrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation (ILOAT).
4. The implied powers doctrine was laid out in the Court's advisory opinion in Reparations
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
5. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation upon
Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
1956 I.C.J. 77 (Oct. 23); Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166 (July 12); Application for Review of Judgement No.
273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325 (July 20); Application for
Review of Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18
(May 27). The three latter opinions constitute over one-third of all advisory opinions issued by
the Court in the past two decades.
6. The only detailed up-to-date account of this aspect of the Court's activity is found in
Rudolf Ostrihansky, Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice as Reviews of Interna-
tional Administrative Tribunals, 17 POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 101 (1988). A recently published work
on this topic does not take into account the Court's opinions of the 1970s and 1980s: Woonsang
Choi, Judicial Review of International Administrative Tribunal Judgments, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LOUIS B. SOHN 347 (Thomas Bu-
ergenthal ed., 1984).
7. See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, The Individual Before Tribunals Exercising International Jurisdic-
tion, I1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 701 (1962); Leo Gross, Participation of Individuals in Advisory
Proceedings before the International Court of Justice: Question of Equality Between the Parties, 52
AM. J. INT'L L. 16 (1958).
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pronouncements; by supporting certain characteristics of administra-
tive tribunals in its opinions given in the 1950s, it has prejudged its
own powers with regard to these organs and has exercised these pow-
ers in the 1970s and 1980s.
Accordingly, this paper is divided into two major parts. The first
deals with the nature and functions of administrative tribunals as
viewed by the ICJ. The second discusses selected problems connected
with the role of the Court as a reviewing body of judgments of admin-
istrative tribunals. The limited scope of this paper does not allow an
insight into the merits of the Court's pronouncements. Therefore, the
second part describes theoretical and procedural problems arising in
the course of the Court's "appellate" activity without evaluating it.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Historical Overview
Although little is known about 'them, international administrative
tribunals have been in existence for a considerable time.8 Their origins
date to the early years of the League of Nations when, in 1927, the
Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations was established.9 In
1932, this tribunal had a counterpart at the Institute of Agriculture,
which, however, never entertained a case. .
The following administrative tribunals were created after World
War II: the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Or-
ganisation (ILOAT) (established in 1946 as successor to the League of
Nations Tribunal), the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
(UNAT) (1949),10 the Administrative Tribunal of the Institute of Uni-
fication of Private Law (1952), the Administrative Tribunal of the Or-
ganization of American States (1971)," and the Administrative
8. However, de Vuyst claims that the tribunals are, "as are international organizations them-
selves," a "relatively new phenomenon." Bruno M. de Vuyst, The Use of Discretionary Authority
by International Organizations in their Relations with International Civil Servants, 12 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 237, 256 (1983); see also BYUNG C. KOH, THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINIS-
TRATIVE TRIBUNAL (1966); Suzanne Bastid, Les tribunaux administratifs internationaux et leur
jurisprudence, 92 R.C.A.D.I. 343 (1957); Bruno M. de Vuyst & Linda L. Thompson, Interna-
tional Administrative Tribunals: A Basic Introduction and Bibliography, 9 INT'L J.L. L1BR. 60
(1981).
9. For an overview of its activity, see, e.g., KAHMATULLAH KHAN, IMPLIED POWERS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 178-83 (1970).
10. UNAT's creation was delayed due to opposition from the United States and the Soviet
Union. These countries feared that the Tribunal would constitute an interference with the Secre-
tary General's control over the Secretariat. De Vuyst, supra note 8, at 257.
11. On its recent activity, see David J. Padilla, Administrative Tribunal of the Organization of
American States, 14 LAW. AM. 259 (1982).
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Tribunal of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (1980).12 The relatively small number of administrative tribu-
nals, when compared with the number of international organizations,
is balanced by the ability of other organizations to adopt the statutes
of either ILOAT or UNAT.' 3 Moreover, some organizations have de-
veloped special boards competent to resolve conflicts between their
staff members and the organization. For example, in the European
Community the power to resolve such disputes has been vested with
the European Court of Justice, and until 1979, also was within the
scope of the ICJ.14
B. Nature of Administrative Tribunals
The nature of international administrative tribunals is somewhat
ambiguous. In general terms, they are bodies established by interna-
tional organizations to decide disputes between those organizations
and their staff members. However, this does not determine whether
they are judicial bodies, advisory organs, or mere subordinate commit-
tees of the main organ. 5 Ascertaining the nature of administrative
tribunals is of crucial importance for discovering the binding force of
their decisions and their relations with other organs. The ICJ was
faced with this problem in its advisory opinion of 1954 concerning
UNAT, 16 in which it laid down the foundations of the system of judi-
cial protection of international officials. The Tribunal had rendered
judgments in the cases of twenty-one former United Nations staff
members discharged by the Secretary General. 17 It decided in favor of
the staff members in ten cases concerning permanent appointments
and one case concerning a temporary appointment; it then ordered
reinstatement in four cases and payment of compensation in lieu of
reinstatement in seven others. Since the Secretary General decided
not to reinstate the four applicants, they too were awarded compensa-
12. For a discussion of its role, see C.F. Amerasinghe, The World Bank Administrative Tri-
bunal, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 748 (1982).
13. For a list of organizations having acceded to those statutes, see de Vuyst, supra note 8, at
257.
14. Id. at 256.
15. See Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tri-
bunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 51 (July 13).
16. Id. at 47.
17. The staff members were U.S. citizens who had refused to answer questions before a Sen-
ate Committee. See Structure and Organization of the United Nations, 1953 U.N.Y.B. 3, 80-85,
U.N. Sales No. 1954.1.15; Written Statement by the Secretary General, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings
(Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal) 188-
248 (July 13, 1954). The political background of the case is expounded in GEORGES LANGROD,
THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE 214-15 (1963).
[Vol. 13:83
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tion in later judgments, and consequently the organization's expenses
exceeded the previously anticipated sum by nearly $180,000.18 Some
States, the United States in particular, advanced the view that the re-
sponsibility and competence of principal organs must prevail over
those of subsidiary organs, and that as a principal organ the General
Assembly had the right to refuse to carry out the Tribunal's awards. 19
As a consequence, a request for an ICJ advisory opinion was formu-
lated, the first part of which read as follows:
Having regard to the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tri-
bunal and to any other relevant instruments and to the relevant records,
has the General Assembly the right on any grounds to refuse to give
effect to an award of compensation made by that Tribunal in favor of a
staff member of the United Nations whose contract of service has been
terminated without his assent?20
When assessing the character of the Tribunal, the Court found it cru-
cial to determine the intent of the founder of UNAT-in this case, the
U.N. General Assembly. Following a textual examination of the Stat-
ute of the Tribunal, the ICJ found terms and expressions such as "tri-
bunal," "judgment," and competence to "pass judgment upon
applications" to be "evidence of the judicial nature of the Tribunal." 21
This led to the conclusion that the Tribunal was "an independent and
truly judicial body pronouncing final judgments without appeal within
the limited field of its functions."'22
The classification of administrative tribunals as judicial organs is
further supported by many other of their characteristics, most of
which relate to the composition of the tribunal. For example, a tribu-
nal may not be composed of parties to a dispute, its members must be
independent, and it must be a permanent body of a determined compo-
sition not subject to any modifications by the parties. 23 Some doubts
about UNAT's classification as a judicial organ arise from the absence
of a requirement that its members have specialized training or legal
qualifications. 24 In practice, however, this "deficiency" is of no great
significance, for administrative tribunals are generally composed of
18. Structure and Organization of the United Nations, supra note 17, at 81.
19. Written Statement of the United States of America, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings (Effect of
Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal) 131-35 (July
13, 1954).
20. 1954 I.C.J. at 48.
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id. at 53.
23. Ostrihansky, supra note 6, at 72-73; see also CARL A. NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF
THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293-97 (1962).
24. 1954 I.C.J. at 92, 93 (dissenting opinion of Judge Carneiro).
Fall 19911
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persons having those qualifications. 25
It should also be underlined that administrative tribunals are inter-
national organs. Their international character is determined not only
by the method of their establishment and their composition,26 but pri-
marily by the law they are bound to apply, namely, "the domestic law
of international organizations, sometimes called 'infra-international
law', . . . recognized in doctrine as an autonomous legal branch of
public international law."' 27 The sources of this law are found in legal
instruments constituting or emanating from international organiza-
tions such as contractual documents, provisions of constituent instru-
ments of the organizations, and staff regulations. 2 When rendering its
award, the tribunal may also take into consideration general principles
of law, as well as the principles of the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights. 29
The ICJ explicitly recognized the international character of admin-
istrative tribunals in its advisory opinion of 1956 dealing with
ILOAT. 30 However, the Court acknowledged at the same time that
administrative tribunals are bodies of a special character. While ad-
mitting that the Tribunal is vested only with "limited jurisdiction," the
ICJ refused to apply to the Tribunal arguments based on the interna-
tional legal principle of sovereignty, of States. The Court held those
arguments "not relevant to a situation in which a tribunal is called
upon to adjudicate upon a complaint of an official against an interna-
tional organization"-as opposed to a dispute between States.3' It
therefore seems that administrative tribunals are "special" interna-
tional judicial organs, having a sui generis character.
C. Legal Bases of Administrative Tribunals
Given that administrative tribunals are organs of a judicial charac-
ter, the next question is where to find their legal basis if the constitu-
tional act of an international organization does not anticipate their
25. T. Meron, Status and Independence of the International Civil Service, 167 R.C.A.D.I.
285, 354-55 (1980).
26. Georges Langrod, Le tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, 67 REVUE DU DROIT
PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 71, 95 (1951).
27. De Vuyst, supra note 8, at 237.
28. Id. at 238-39.
29. Manfred Lachs, Jurisdictional Organs (Organization and Procedure), in MANUEL SUR
LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES / A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
146, 163 (Ren6-Jean Dupuy ed., 1988).
30. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation
upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi-
zation, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 97 (Oct. 23).
31. Id.
[Vol. 13:83
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existence. The problem would not arise if administrative tribunals
were simple subsidiary organs. Usually, however, the power to create
such organs is expressly provided for in the constitutional act. The
authorization may take the form of a general authorization for all
main organs to create such bodies, specific authorization for each of
the main organs, or authorization to create subsidiary organs in a
given field of activity of the organization. 32 However, constitutional
acts do not always anticipate the structural needs of an international
organization. 33
It is a well-established rule that international organizations may
create additional auxiliary organs necessary for carrying out their
functions even absent express statutory authorization. This aspect of
implied powers was first recognized doctrinally in the League of Na-
tions period by Dionisio Anzilotti.34 Since Anzilotti's time, the capac-
ity of international organizations to create auxiliary organs has
developed considerably: in practice, the functions and powers of the
latter may go so far as to resemble those of a separate international
organization-as is the case with United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), or United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO). As some authors note, the United Nations has followed a
"pragmatic approach" in this regard; the composition, terms of refer-
ence, and methods of operation of the organs have been "adapted to
the special requirements of the particular task to be undertaken. '35
According to traditional concepts, the question of powers of sub-
sidiary organs, as well as their relationship to the main organs, was
subject to a simple rule: the main organ was always free to decide the
new organ's scope and composition, the range of its activities, and the
effects of its resolutions. Since their powers were delegated, secon-
dary, and dependent upon the powers of the main organ, subsidiary
organs could not be assigned powers broader that those of the main
32. S. Torres Bernirdez, Subsidiary Organs, in MANUEL SUR LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNA-
TIONALES / A HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 29, at 100, 111.
The author notes that the U.N. Charter provides examples of all three forms of authorization,
33. Id. at 103.
34. Anzilotti advanced the theory that some organs should have the capacity of "auto-deter-
mination," that is, the power to determine their own method of functioning in the absence of
express statutory provisions. 1 DIONIsIO ANZILOTTI, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 295-96
(1929). On the doctrine of implied powers, see, e.g., KHAN, supra note 9; BERNARD ROUYER-
HAMERAY, LES COMPtTENCES IMPLICITES DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES (Bib-
lioth6que de droit international tome 25, 1962).
35. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENT 104 (3d ed. 1969).
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organ.36
The U.N. Charter does not explicitly provide for the General As-
sembly or any other organ to establish a body empowered to decide
disputes between staff members and the organization. The powers to
establish subsidiary organs have been vested in the General Assembly,
in general terms, by Article 22 and Article 7(2). 37 Those provisions do
not in any way determine the character of the new bodies except for
stating the condition that they be "necessary" (with no further qualifi-
cations) or "necessary for the performance" of the Assembly's func-
tions. If the traditional concept of subsidiary organs is applied, none
of those provisions could qualify as a sufficient basis for the creation of
a tribunal of such a nature as that determined by the ICJ with respect
to UNAT. The functions exercised by UNAT are not exactly "func-
tions embraced within the overall functions of the principal organ and
closely corresponding to the legitimate activities of the principal or-
gan.'"38 The General Assembly is not vested with judicial functions
itself and as such could not have delegated powers to resolve disputes
to its subsidiary body. The doctrine of nemo dat qui non habet sup-
ports this argument.
The Charter of the United Nations does, however, mention staff
members in several of its provisions. It imposes on them a number of
obligations and responsibilities. By virtue of Article 100, they are re-
quired not to seek or receive instructions from any government or
from any authority external to the organization, and to refrain from
any action which may reflect on their position as international officials
responsible only to the organization. Article 101(3) specifies further
expectations:
The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the
determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of secur-
ing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Due
regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a
geographical basis as possible.
At the same time, the Secretary General and the General Assem-
36. See, e.g., HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LAW 204-05
(1980).
37. U.N. Charter Article 7(2) provides: "Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary
may be established in accordance with the present Charter." U.N. Charter Article 22 provides:
"The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the per-
formance of its functions."
38. Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tri-
bunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 226 (July 12) (separate opinion of Judge Oneyama). Judge Oneyama did
not consider UNAT to be a subsidiary organ within the meaning of Article 22.
[Vol. 13:83
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bly have wide discretion with regard to staff matters.39 Given the high
expectations of the staff members, on the one hand, and the far-reach-
ing discretion of the two mentioned organs, on the other hand, it is
striking that the Charter provides no mechanism of control against
frivolous actions of superior officers. 4° Koh admits that if an organi-
zation is to "function properly-that is to say, if its administration is
to be flexible, realistic, and responsive, not only to organization but to
situational needs,"'4 t then wide discretionary powers are required by
the administrator, but this in turn "necessitates some kind of control
mechanism." 42
It is surprising, then, that officials do not have access to the ICJ,
the organization's judicial organ. Under Article 34(1), only States and
not individuals or international organizations, may be parties before
the Court, nor may officials bring cases against the organization before
domestic courts. In this connection it is interesting to note that such
an attempt was made with regard to the Organization of American
States (OAS). Several of its officials, disappointed by the decisions of
the organization's Administrative Tribunal, initiated proceedings
against the OAS in U.S. courts. The United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit dismissed the action on the grounds of immunity
of international organizations:
[I]nternational organizations, and particularly the Organization of
American States, are creatures of treaty and by virtue of treaty stand in a
different position with respect to the issue of immunity than sovereign
nations. The Court is persuaded that international organizations are im-
mune from every form of legal process except insofar as that immunity is
expressly waived by treaty or expressly limited by statute. The Court is
further persuaded that this Court has jurisdiction over lawsuits involving
international organizations only insofar as such jurisdiction is expressly
provided by statute.43
The Court also noted that "the special nature of the law governing
employment in international organizations, clearly linked as it is with
delicate questions of administrative policy, makes municipal tribunals
totally unsuited to deal with it." 44
39. This is inferred from U.N. Charter Article 101(1), which provides: "The staff shall be
appointed by the Secretary General under regulations established by the General Assembly."
40. Compare KHAN, supra note 9, at 170-72 and KOH, supra note 8, at 26-28.
41. KOH, supra note 8, at 24.
42. Id.
43. Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The only activity the
Court was willing to consider not shielded by the doctrine of immunity was "commercial activ-
ity," but the Court treated the relationship of an international organization with its internal
administrative staff as "noncommercial." Id. at 33-35.
44. Id. at 35 n.27 (citing MICHAEL AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 12 (1967)).
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There are, as Koh suggests, two kinds of control mechanisms po-
tentially available to international officials: hierarchical and judicial
control. 45 The former has the disadvantage of making the administra-
tor "a judge in his own case." Needless to say, this solution would be
satisfactory neither to the official nor to the administrator. 46 Bastid
points out that without tribunals, staff disputes would remain unset-
tled, being sans juge.47 This would make the maintenance of highly
qualified and independent staff practically impossible.48 In this con-
nection, the Circuit Court in Broadbent v. OAS said:
There is therefore a vacuum which needs to be filled by the organizations
themselves. The creation of an independent body, empowered to make
binding decisions in legal disputes between an organization and its staff,
is by no means an altruistic gesture from the organization's point of
view; without it, officials might suffer from a sense of injustice which
would impair the smooth running of the Secretariat. 49
The U.S. court was merely reiterating a concept which had been
expounded a quarter of a century earlier. In its advisory opinion of
1954, the ICJ relied heavily on the concept of necessity, 50 and resorted
to the doctrine of implied powers to justify the establishment of
UNAT. As a first step, the Court noted that there is neither an ex-
press provision for the establishment of such a body, nor an indication
to the contrary.5 Next, it invoked its famous dictum from its 1949
opinion:
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are con-
ferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the perform-
ance of its duties.52
The Court's conclusion was preceded by an analysis of the Charter
provisions governing relations between staff members and the organi-
zation. The Court noted that the relevant provisions and staff regula-
tions form a "complex code of law" and that "[i]t was inevitable that
45. KOH, supra note 8, at 24-25.
46. NORGAARD, supra note 23, at 289.
47. Bastid, supra note 8, at 365-66.
48. Meron, supra note 25, at 354.
49. 628 F.2d at 35 n.27 (quoting MICHAEL AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOY-
MENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 12 (1962)). In Koh's words, "[t]he rationale for
administrative tribunals in general is to be found, finally, in the operational needs of a large-scale
administrative organization." KOH, supra note 8, at 24.
50. DENYS SIMON, L'INTERPRtTATION JUDICIAIRE DES TRAITtS D'ORGANISATIONS INTER-
NATIONALES 201 (Publications de la Revue G~nrale de Droit International Public, No. 37,
1981).
51. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribu-
nal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 56 (July 13).
52. 1954 I.C.J. at 56 (quoting Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 182 (Apr. 11)).
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there would be disputes between the Organization and staff members
as to their rights and duties." 3 In these circumstances, the lack of
judicial or arbitral remedy would be inconsistent with "the expressed
aim of the Charter to promote freedom and justice for individuals.15 4
The power to establish an administrative tribunal was thus "essential
to ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to give effect to
the paramount consideration of securing the highest standard of effi-
ciency, competence and integrity. Capacity to do this arises by neces-
sary intendment- out of the Charter." 55
As far as the organ capable of creating UNAT is concerned, the
Court had "no room for doubt" that it had been within the powers of
the-General Assembly, which by virtue of Article 101(1) is responsible
for adopting regulations concerning staff matters. Although the ICJ
also invoked Article 7(2) and Article 22, it carefully avoided classify-
ing UNAT as a subsidiary organ within the meaning of those provi-
sions.56 Some authors believe that the ICJ rejected Article 22 as the
legal basis of UNAT. 57 This could be justified in view of a later state-
ment in the Court's opinion that "[b]y establishing the Administrative
Tribunal, the General Assembly was not delegating the performance
of its own functions: it was exercising a power which it had under the
Charter to regulate staff relations."5 8 However, in its opinion of 1973,
the ICJ indirectly confirmed that Article 22, read together with Arti-
cle 101(1), was the basis of UNAT.59
There is a difference between establishing an organ in order to
delegate to it the performance of the principal organ's functions, and
establishing an organ the existence and activity of which is necessary
for the performance of the functions of the principal organ. In the
latter case, delegation does not have to take place. In other words, if
for the General Assembly and other organs to function effectively the
creation of a new body is necessary, then this body's existence will be
53. 1954 I.C.J. at 57.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Classifying the Administrative Tribunal as a mere subsidiary organ would lead to Judge
Hackworth's conclusion that a subsidiary organ's decision could not bind a principal organ pos-
sessing plenary powers under the Charter: "This would present an anomalous and unique situa-
tion in international organization-a situation that can find no sanction, express or implied, in
the Charter." Id. at 79 (dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth).
57. Eg., Francis A. Vallat, The Competence of the United Nations General Assembly, 97
R.C.A.D.I. 203, 283 (1959).
58. 1954 I.C.J. at 61.
59. Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 172-73 (July 12).
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"necessary for the proper performance of functions" of those organs,
although it will exercise functions not vested in the main organ.
Another interpretation is advanced by Seyersted, who advocates
"inherent powers" of international organizations. Seyersted believes
that the right to establish an administrative tribunal flows from the
right of international organizations to settle internal disputes with
binding force, and that this right is limited only by explicit statutory
provisions to the contrary. 6°
In Koh's view, it is manifest that Articles 22 and 101(1) "clothe
the General Assembly with full authority to create any organ, be it
judicial or advisory, intended to deal with personnel disputes within
the United Nations."'6 t It seems that this view merits support.
In 1973 the ICJ fully confirmed the propriety of the establishment
and functioning of the UNAT system:
The adoption by the General Assembly of the Statute of the Administra-
tive Tribunal and the jurisprudence developed by this judicial organ con-
stitute a system of judicial safeguards which protects officials of the
United Nations against wrongful action of the administration, including
such exercise of discretionary powers as may have been determined by
improper motives, in violation of the rights or legitimate expectations of
a staff member.62
D. Binding Force of Awards of Administrative Tribunals
Identification of the parties before the Tribunal is important to
evaluate the effects of its decisions. If the parties are the staff member
concerned and the Secretary General or another administrative officer,
then the dispute is "between component parts of an organ," and as
such cannot be binding on the organization as a whole. 63 The ICJ
took a different view: the organization itself was a party, with the
Secretary General acting only as its representative. Accordingly, since
the Tribunal's judgments are by virtue of its Statute final and without
appeal, the organization "becomes legally bound to carry out the
judgment and to pay the compensation awarded to the staff mem-
60. Finn Seyersted, Settlement of Internal Disputes of lntergovernmental Organizations by
Internal and External Courts, 24 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT
UND VLbLKERRECHT 1, 53 (1964).
61. KOH, supra note 8, at 51.
62. 1973 I.C.J. at 205.
63. See Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tri-
bunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 82 (July 13) (dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth) and id. at 94 (dis-
senting opinion of Judge Carneiro). Compare Application for Review of Judgement of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325, 374 (July 20) (separate opinion of
Judge Ruda). In his opinion, Judge Ruda states-maybe as a simplification-that the parties to
the dispute are the Secretary General and the staff member, but attributes the same consequences
to the dispute as if the Organization itself were a party.
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ber." 64 As such, all organs of the United Nations, the General Assem-
bly included, are bound by the Tribunal's judgment. The Court
recalled here the "well-established and generally recognized principle
of law (that) a judgment rendered by such a judicial body is res
judicata and has binding force between the parties to the dispute." 65
The binding force of an award of an administrative tribunal is af-
fected by two principal factors: the judicial character of the organ and
the fact that, as noted above, the organization is a party to the dispute.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the main organ is wholly
bound by the decisions of the administrative tribunal or whether, in
some circumstances, it is empowered to modify or refuse to give effect
to an award of an administrative tribunal.66
In its 1954 advisory opinion the Court drew attention to the lan-
guage of the Statute of UNAT and found the lack of any provision on
review of its judgments to be a "deliberate decision" on the part of the
General Assembly: "Like the Assembly of the League of Nations it
refrained from laying down any exception to the rule conferring on the
Tribunal the power to pronounce final judgments without appeal."'67
The ICJ excluded any possibility of the General Assembly acting
as a review organ:
[T]he Court is of the opinion that the General Assembly itself, in view of
its composition and functions, could hardly act as a judicial organ-con-
sidering the arguments of the parties, appraising the evidence produced
by them, establishing the facts and declaring the law applicable to
them-all the more so as one party to the dispute is the United Nations
Organization itself.68
The Court's answer was not limited to the factual situation under-
lying the request for the advisory opinion in question; it was formu-
lated in more general terms. The ICJ stressed that an award of
UNAT could be subject to review only if an express provision to that
effect existed in its Statute or in another legal instrument:
In order that the judgments pronounced by such a judicial tribunal could
be subjected to review by any body other than the tribunal itself, it would
be necessary, in the opinion of the Court, that the statute of that tribunal
or some other legal instrument governing it should contain an express
64. 1954 I.C.J. at 53.
65. Id.
66. Because the decisions of administrative tribunals are also binding on particular Member
States, the problem has implications beyond the problems of the internal functioning of the or-
ganization. In this connection, Seyersted points out that such decisions should be treated in the
same way as judgments of domestic courts. Seyersted, supra note 60, at 54.
67. 1954 I.C.J. at 54-55.
68. Id. at 56.
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provision to that effect. 69
In consequence, the General Assembly could influence the finality
of the Tribunal's judgments solely by modifying the latter's Statute or
enacting another instrument containing the required provision, which
meant that the Assembly's indirect "control" could not be retroactive.
The Court did not exclude the possibility of the Tribunal "itself
revising a judgment in special circumstances when new facts of deci-
sive importance have been discovered," finding this situation to lie
outside of the notion of "appeal" as used in Article 10(2) of the Statute
of UNAT.
In order to strengthen its conclusion, the Court had to reject sev-
eral contentions, one of which was that the establishment of a tribunal
with authority to make decisions binding on the General Assembly
was not "absolutely essential" for the performance of the Assembly's
functions. The Court replied that "[t]he precise nature and scope of
the measures by which the power of creating a tribunal was to be exer-
cised, was a matter for determination by the General Assembly
alone."' 70 Thus, the General Assembly had wide discretion in this re-
gard-wide enough to deprive itself as a superior authority of the
power to control the judgments of UNAT.
Another contention was based on the conflict between the binding
character of the Tribunal's awards and explicit provisions of the U.N.
Charter concerning budgetary powers of the Assembly. According to
Article 17(1) of the Charter, the General Assembly shall consider and
approve the budget of the organization. It was argued that the Gen-
eral Assembly could not have divested itself of these powers, which
allegedly would occur if it were forced to accept the Tribunal's judg-
ments without restrictions.71 However, the ICJ construed the notion
of "approving" the budget narrowly, excluding "an absolute power to
approve or disapprove the expenditure proposed to it.' '72 Where an
expenditure arises out of obligations already incurred by the organiza-
tion (and UNAT awards would fall within this category), the Assem-
bly has "no alternative but to honour these engagements. ' 73 It would
certainly be contrary to the fundamental principles of justice and fair-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 58.
71. For example, in Judge Hackworth's opinion the General Assembly could not have given
"prior blanket approval to unpredictable amounts called for by awards of the Tribunal"; he
found "no justification for ascribing to the Assembly such a broad curtailment of its constitu-
tional functions." Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 85 (July 13) (dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth).
72, Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
73. Id.
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ness if the organization as a party to the dispute had the privilege of
deciding whether to carry out its financial obligations.
It was also argued that the implied power of the General Assembly
could not go so far as to enable the Tribunal to encroach on the pow-
ers of the Secretary General. In response to that contention, the Court
relied on Article 101 of the U.N. Charter, inferring from it the capac-
ity of the General Assembly to limit or control the powers of the Sec-
retary General in staff matters "at all times."' 74  As such, any
consequent action of UNAT, having ex ante approval of the Assembly
as expressed in the UNAT Statute, was within these limits established
by the General Assembly.75
The strongest arguments, and from a doctrinal point of view the
most troublesome, were connected with viewing UNAT as a subsidi-
ary organ within the meaning of Article 22 of the Charter. Judge
Hackworth's views are exemplary in this regard. Maintaining the cau-
tious approach towards expanding the organization's powers which he
had adopted in the Court's 1949 advisory opinion,76 he took the stand
that the doctrine of implied powers "is designed to implement, within
reasonable limitations, and not to supplant or vary, expressed pow-
ers." In his opinion, the existence of an express provision-in this case
Article 22-made it impossible to use this doctrine to justify the crea-
tion of a tribunal of "a supposedly different kind."'77 If UNAT were a
subsidiary organ in the traditional sense, it could not in any way im-
pose its decisions on the main organ.
Judge Alvarez based his arguments against the binding force of
UNAT's judgments on the presumption that the General Assembly
was an "all-powerful legislative organ" bound only by the U.N. Char-
ter, or by its own resolutions, with nothing above it except "moral
forces." 78 However, if such were the case, was it not correct to assume
that this "omnipotent" organ could be powerful enough to create a
body competent to give unconditionally binding decisions? 79
74. Id. at 60.
75. In its 1982 advisory opinion, the ICJ confirmed that the Secretary General is an organ
inferior to the General Assembly in staff matters. Application for Review of Judgement No. 273
of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325, 359-60 (July 20). Judge Man-
fred Lachs speaks even of the General Assembly's "inherent power of control over the Secretary-
General." Id. at 429 (dissenting opinion of Judge Lachs).
76. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174,
196-204 (Apr. 11) (dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth).
77. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribu-
nal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 80-81 (July 13) (dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth).
78. Id. at 71-72 (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez).
79. When Judge Alvarez's dissenting opinion is analyzed from this point of view, one won-
ders why he did not join the majority opinion. ADAM BASAK, DECISIONS OF THE UNITED NA-
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As has been mentioned, the Court was careful to avoid classifying
UNAT as a subsidiary organ within the meaning of Article 22 of the
U.N. Charter. This did not mean, however, that the General Assem-
bly had excluded any possibility of control over the Tribunal or that
the latter was in any way superior to the Assembly. The ICJ empha-
sized that the UNAT Statute could be changed at any time by the
main organ. 0 It played well on the argument of broad powers of the
General Assembly-perhaps as a reply to Judge Alvarez's objec-
tions-by explicitly rejecting the contention that the Assembly was
"inherently incapable of creating a tribunal competent to make deci-
sions binding on itself."81
It should be mentioned that although judgments of UNAT are fi-
nal and without appeal-even the General Assembly is powerless to
review or control these judgments-the Tribunal itself cannot exercise
any control over the Assembly's actions outside of the context of a
dispute with a staff member. The Tribunal has an obligation to accept
and apply decisions of the General Assembly adopted in conformity
with Article 101 of the U.N. Charter; its power does not extend to a
review of these decisions.8 2
Another problem worth noting is the relationship of the Tribunal
to other organs of the international organization. For example, one
may wonder to what extent an advisory tribunal may appraise the dis-
cretionary activity of those organs. One of the questions submitted to
the ICJ, in connection with the ILOAT case, concerned the compe-
tence of the Tribunal to determine whether the power of the Director
General of ILO not to review fixed-term appointments had been exer-
cised "for the good of the service and in the interest of the Organiza-
tion."18 3 It was argued that if ILOAT was denied this competence, the
administration could always invoke the latter notion to avoid review of
its actions.84 The Court refused to reply to that question, leaving it
open, but an analysis of the whole of the Court's opinion may give an
TIONS ORGANS IN THE JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 152 (1969).
80. Two years later, the Court also relied on the provisions of the Statute of ILOAT as an
expression of the principal organ's intentions when it issued its 1956 advisory opinion refusing to
answer one of the questions submitted to it. The Court based its refusal precisely on the grounds
that the Statute did not provide the reasons for challenging the decision of the Tribunal as formu-
lated in that question, and stressed that the Statute could have done so. Judgment of the Admin-
istrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 99 (Oct. 23).
81. 1954 I.C.J. at 61.
82. See Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325, 363 (July 20).
83. 1956 I.C.J. at 79.
84. Written Statements, 1956 I.C.J. Pleadings (Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of
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indication of what the hypothetical answer could have been. The
Court took care to emphasize the necessity to take into account both
the "wording of the texts in question" as well as "their spirit, namely,
the purpose for which they were adopted. ' 85 In its 1973 opinion the
ICJ explicitly stated that the system of protection created by the estab-
lishment of UNAT is also directed against "such exercise of discre-
tionary powers as may have been determined by improper motives, in
violation of the rights or legitimate expectations of a staff member."816
However, in its most recent opinion the Court seems to have with-
drawn from the line previously adopted. When referring to a conten-
tion that the Secretary General had ignored priorities established by
Article 101(3) of the U.N. Charter, the Court underlined that "it was
not for the Tribunal, nor indeed for the Court, to substitute its own
appreciation of the problem for that of the Secretary General."' 87 It
would seem, however, that the proper functioning of the whole system
requires that an administrative tribunal have full freedom to appraise
the criteria on which a decision of an administrative officer is based.
This requirement appears to be a prerequisite for ensuring that such
decisions comply with the organization's statute and staff regulations.
E. Committee on Applications for Review
The ICJ's advisory opinion of 1954 had significant consequences,
both in theory and practice. The opinion confirmed the power of in-
ternational organizations to regulate the internal sphere of their func-
tioning and supported the development of the concept of internal law
of international organizations.88
As concerns UNAT, and to a great degree administrative tribunals
in general, "not only did the Court firmly establish the judicial charac-
ter of the Tribunal, but it considerably enhanced the authority and
respectability of its judgment. This was a significant contribution to
the continued existence as well as the progressive development of the
the International Labour Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 77, 179-80 (Oct. 23, 1956).
85. 1956 I.C.J. at 98. The purpose of the system is "to ensure to the Organization the serv-
ices of a personnel possessing the necessary qualifications of competence and integrity and effec-
tively protected by appropriate guarantees in the matter of observance of the terms of
employment and of the provisions of Staff Regulations." Id. Thus, it seems that the ICJ was
inclined to favor the Tribunal's exercising broad control over the discretionary action of adminis-
tration officers.
86. Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 205 (July 12).
87. Application for Review of Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18, 63 (May 27).
88. BASAK, supra note 79, at 153-54.
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Tribunal."89
Most importantly, the opinion contained, in Judge de Arechaga's
words, a "thinly veiled suggestion for the establishment of a system of
judicial review." 9  As a result, in 1955 UNAT's Statute was
amended 91 and a special (though in many respects imperfect) system
of review was set up.92
By virtue of Article 11(1) of the UNAT Statute, a Member State,
the Secretary General, or a person in respect of whom a judgment has
been rendered by the Tribunal may request the review93 of the Tribu-
nal's judgment on several grounds.94
The request is forwarded to the Committee on Applications for
Review of Judgments- of the Administrative Tribunal, which decides
whether there is a substantial basis for the application and, if so, re-
quests an advisory opinion of the ICJ.95 Under Article 11(2), the Sec-
retary General is obliged to arrange to transmit to the Court the views
of the person referred to in paragraph 1. According to paragraph 3,
after the opinion has been rendered, it is also the duty of the Secretary
General to give effect to the opinion or request the Tribunal to con-
vene specially in order to confirm its judgment or bring it into con-
formity with the opinion of the Court. The Committee, anticipated by
Article 11(4) of the Statute, is a body composed of Member States, the
representatives of which have served on the General Committee of the
most recent regular session of the General Assembly.96 Its main func-
89. KOH, supra note 8, at 123.
90. 1973 I.C.J. at 243 (separate opinion of Judge de Arechaga).
91. G.A. Res. 957(X), U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/3116
(1955).
92. On the procedure, see, e.g., Jacques Dehaussy, La procddure de rdformation des juge-
ments du Tribunal administratif des Nations Unies, 1956 ANNUAIRE FRANgAIS DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL 460 (1956). The procedure's legality and propriety were objected to from the
outset. One delegation made a formal proposal that the Court be requested to give an advisory
opinion in this regard. See 1973 I.C.J at 171. See infra Part III for a discussion of the procedure.
93. Article 11(1) does not actually use the term "review," but rather the expression "objects
to the judgement" (of the Tribunal). However, the nature of the procedure was confirmed by the
name given to the Committee provided for in Article 11: the Committee on Applications for
Review of Judgments of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Statute of the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Art. 11(1), adopted by Res. 351A(IV), U.N. Doc. A/ 1127
(1949), reprinted in STATUTES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRA-
TIVE TRIBUNALS 23 (Bruno M. de Vuyst ed., 1981).
94. See infra discussion accompanying note 124.
95. In the event the Committee finds a "substantial basis" for review, the request is
mandatory: Article 11(2) of the Statute of the United Nations Adminsitrative Tribunal uses the
word "shall." Resort to the ICJ is not very common; prior to the 1973 advisory opinion the
Committee had dealt with sixteen applications for review, all of which arose from staff members.
1973 I.C.J. at 176.
96. The requirement is not mandatory, as was demonstrated by the 1982 advisory opinion.
The representative of Sierra Leone, who was unable to attend the Committee's twentieth session,
had delegated the representative of Canada as his substitute, even though Canada was not a
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tion is the examination of an application submitted in accordance with
Article 11(1) with the object of deciding whether there is a substantial
basis for resort to the ICJ.
It took nearly two decades after the 1955 amendment before an
application based on Article 11 of the UNAT Statute resulted in the
initiation of proceedings before the ICJ. The Court's advisory opinion
of 1973 was more than a reply to the questions concerning the Tribu-
nal's judgment; it constituted the first and most profound evaluation of
the controversial review procedure and-what is relevant at this
point-of the nature and place of the Committee.
Most criticism raised with regard to the Committee was directed at
its authority to request advisory opinions from the ICJ. It was argued
that the Committee was not an "organ" within the meaning of Article
96(2) of the U.N. Charter. Judge Gros insisted that this body
devoid as it is of permanence and of continuity in its composition, and
not accumulating any experience is merely a kind of occasional panel
meeting at irregular intervals, or a conference of member States, but cer-
tainly not an organ in the proper, institutional sense of the word.97
The Court rejected this argument, noting that Article 11(4) of the
UNAT Statute provides for "no more than a convenient method of
establishing the membership of the Committee, which was set up as a
separate committee invested with its own functions distinct from those
of the General Committee. '98 The Court drew attention to the provi-
sion allowing the Committee to establish its own rules of procedure
which, in the Court's view, was a sufficient guarantee of the indepen-
dence of the Committee-a prerequisite of its being considered an
"organ." 99
It was furthermore contended that the Committee did not have
''any activities of its own," and consequently that there could be no
"legal questions arising within the scope" of its activitiesu°°-another
prerequisite for resorting to the ICJ according to Article 96(2) of the
Charter.
However, the ICJ was content that Article 96(2) of the Charter
member of the Committee at that time. The ICJ held that although irregular, this circumstance
did not affect the validity of the Committee's request for an advisory opinion. Application for
Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325,
342-43 (July 20).
97. Application for the Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 259 (July 12) (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros); see also id. at 298
(dissenting opinion of Judge Morozov) and id. at 225-26 (separate opinion of Judge Oneyama).
98. Id. at 173.
99. Id.
100. E.g., 2 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
690 (1965).
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and Article 11(4) of the UNAT Statute "prima facie, suffice to estab-
lish the competence of the Committee to request advisory opinions of
the Court." 10 1 The Court admitted that the scope of activities of the
Committee was a narrow one, 102 but was inclined to view them "in the
larger context of the General Assembly's function in the regulation of
staff relations of which they form a part."' 1 3 The mere fact that the
Committee's activities served a "particular, limited purpose" in the
General Assembly's function in this field could not constitute a bar to
its establishment. Nor did the Court find any limitation in the power
of the General Assembly to authorize the Committee to request advi-
sory opinionsl°4 even if the latter were not in fact to be used for the
purposes of the requesting organ's activities. 0 5
When dealing with the problem of whether the General Assembly
possessed the power to create an organ of such nature and functions as
those of the Committee, the Court had, as in 1954, to face the tension
arising from the possibility of a narrow interpretation of Articles 7 and
22 of the U.N. Charter: 0 6 If the Committee is vested with quasi-judi-
cial functions that the General Assembly itself does not possess, on
what basis could the former organ have been established? Again, the
answer seems to lie in the presumption that the organ in question is
created to facilitate the performance of the main organ's functions in
general, without there necessarily occurring a delegation of functions.
Indeed, the Court followed a similar line as it did in 1954. It
pointed out that Article 22 "specifically leaves it to the General As-
101. 1973 I.C.J. at 173.
102. The Court listed the following functions: receiving applications which formulate objec-
tions to judgments of the Administrative Tribunal, deciding within thirty days whether there is a
substantial basis for an application and, if the Committee so decides, requesting an advisory
opinion from the Court. The Court stressed that the primary function of the Committee is not
the requesting of advisory opinions, but examining objections to judgments or "screening."
Thus, any legal questions submitted arise not out of judgments of UNAT, but out of objections to
those judgments. 1973 I.C.J. at 174. There is disagreement about the classification of the Com-
mittee's functions. The Court itself has referred to them as "quasi-judicial." Id. at 176. Judge
Lachs takes a contrary view. Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Na-
tions Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325, 432 (July 20) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Lachs). According to Judge Ago they are "certainly judicial or at least quasi-judicial." Applica-
tion for Review of Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1987
I.C.J. 18, 108 (May 27) (separate opinion of Judge Ago).
103. 1973 I.C.J. at 174.
104. Id.
105. Id. In a later passage the Court added that "there is nothing in Article 96 of the Char-
ter or Article 65 of the Statute of the Court which requires that the replies to the questions
should be designed to assist the requesting body in its own future operations or which makes it
obligatory that the effect to be given to an advisory opinion should be the responsibility of the
body requesting the opinion." Id. at 175.
106. See A.I.L. Campbell, The Limits of Powers of International Organisations, 32 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 523, 526 (1983).
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sembly to appreciate the need for any particular organ," the sole re-
striction being the necessity for performance of its functions. 10 7 The
Court admitted that here there had been no instance of delegation of
functions, relying once again (as it had done with regard to UNAT) on
Article 101(1) of the Charter to conclude that:
it necessarily follows that the General Assembly's power to regulate staff
relations also comprises the power to create an organ designed to pro-
vide machinery for initiating the review of judgments of such a
tribunal. 10 8
It seems that the Court could have emphasized more strongly the need
for the creation of a review procedure, a prerequisite for the successful
functioning of the staff dispute resolution system and for the protec-
tion of officials. Judge de Castro pointed out that "[t]he Committee is
an organ which is supplementary to the Administrative Tribunal; it
was set up to provide additional guarantees of the judicial function of
the Tribunal."' 1 9
There is no doubt that the General Assembly had the power to
create the Committee on Applications for Review of Judgments of the
Administrative Tribunal-a follow-up body to the Administrative Tri-
bunal itself. The power to regulate staff relations implies the power to
create judicial and quasi-judicial organs for the benefit of staff mem-
bers. Here "[t]he need for some screening organ designed to avoid
frivolous or unjustified objections being brought before the Court can-
not be denied."" t0
With the creation of the Committee, the U.N. system of judicial
resolution of staff disputes became complete.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
PROCEDURE OF REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
A. General Remarks
In its 1973 advisory opinion, the ICJ sanctioned the establishment
of a review procedure of judgments of UNAT. It had done the same
with regard to ILOAT in its 1956 advisory opinion.III In both opin-
ions the ICJ had shown its willingness to accept the role entrusted to it
107. Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 172-73 (July 12).
108. Id. at 173.
109. Id. at 277 (dissenting opinion of Judge de Castro).
110. Id. at 244 (separate opinion of Judge de Arechaga).
111. However, it seems that in 1956 the Court took a very cautious approach: it acknowl-
edged that the procedure was an unusual one by stressing that the Court was not bound for the
future by the opinions advanced in this case. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the
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in the protection of staff members of international organizations hav-
ing resort to those two tribunals. It did, in fact, assume the task of a
court of appeals-a task without any direct legal basis in the ICJ
Statute.
It must be underlined at the outset that viewing the ICJ as a court
of appeals is not as unusual as it first seems. After all, many disputes
are brought before the Court when all other dispute settlement meth-
ods have failed and there is hope that the Court will serve as a resort
of last instance. Most of the Court's advisory proceedings were pre-
ceded by bitter legal and political controversies. One may risk the as-
sertion that since most advisory opinions deal with some specific
aspect of the activity of an international organization, they constitute
in fact a form of review-an assessment, on the merits, of the organi-
zation's actions. The Expenses opinion 1t 2 serves as an example. In
that case the ICJ had to evaluate the legality and propriety of estab-
lishing peace-keeping forces, which involved the analysis of the legal-
ity of resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security
Council. In that sense, advisory opinions are often a form of "appeal"
or "quasi-appeal" from decisions and other resolutions of various
bodies. 113
What is striking in the case of applications for review of adminis-
trative judgments is that the parties involved are, on the one hand, an
international organization, and, on the other hand, an individual.
This raises many problems of both doctrinal and practical
significance. 114
According to Article 34 of the ICJ Statute, the ICJ is an organ
established to settle disputes between States, which are the primary
subjects of international law, and not between any other subjects of
international law. Despite pressure" 5 to broaden the reach of the
Statute to include international organizations within the jurisdiction of
the Court, Article 34 has remained unchanged. International organi-
International Labour Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 86 (Oct. 23).
112. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17(2) Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20).
113. See KENNETH J. KEITH, THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 229 (1971).
114. Opinions that this procedure "contravenes the principles of the Charter and the Statute
of the Court" are not uncommon. See, e.g., 1973 I.C.J. at 296 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Morozov).
115. This pressure was especially strong after the Court's 1949 advisory opinion in which the
ICJ confirmed that an international organization could be a party to an international dispute,
and that disputes between international organizations and States were likely. See, e.g., HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 181 n.14 (1958); GUENTER WEISSBERG, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 189-200 (1961).
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zations can resort to the Court solely in advisory proceedings. It must
be added that since the ICJ (and its predecessor) have had time and
practice to deal with legal questions connected with international or-
ganizations, the procedure under which the organization in question
submits its views and opinions has been well elaborated.
Another problem created by the review procedure is the access of
individuals to the ICJ. Even today some authors deny individuals the
privilege of being subjects of international law. The ICJ Statute is
based on traditional concepts and is silent -in this regard.11 6 Through
the review procedure individuals have obtained an indirect capacity to
appear before an international tribunal. Of course, this concerns only
a special category of individuals-international civil servants of a few
selected international organizations. It is of some interest to note that
the Court has always been an advocate of the special position of this
category of persons in international law; as long ago as in the above-
cited opinion of 1949 it drew a number of far-reaching conclusions
from this special position, and as recently as 1989 it confirmed the
distinct character of an official of an international organization.11 7
The problem remains as to how to reconcile the involvement of the
ICJ in a dispute between an international organization and its official
with the Court's judicial character as it is traditionally perceived.
Even the Judges of the ICJ have not spared the procedure profound
criticism, referring to it as a "hybrid procedure,"118 pointing out its
incompatibility with the rules of the ICJ Statute and of the U.N. Char-
ter,'1 9 and with the judicial tasks of the Court.1 20
Nevertheless, it appears that through this procedure, in a very in-
116. This problem, however, had already arisen before the Permanent Court of International
Justice in 1935 in connection with the case of the Danzig Legislative Decrees. The Court admit-
ted written statements from individuals representing three minority political parties, but decided
against oral hearings of the petitioners. Gross, supra note 7, at 16.
117. Applicability of Art. VI, Sec. 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (Dec. 15), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 100 (1990).
118. See, e.g., Judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organi-
sation Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 108 (Oct. 23) (separate opinion of Judge Winiarski); Application
for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J.
325, 432 (July 20) (dissenting opinion of Judge Lachs) (pointing out the "basically hybrid nature
of the system). On the other hand, Judge de Castro took the view that this "hybrid procedure"
and "pseudo-advisory opinion" are "a legitimate development of the law, on the lines of the
techniques of Common Law or the Roman praetor, whereby existing provisions are employed for
new ends." Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 275 (July 12) (dissenting opinion of Judge de Castro).
119. See, e.g., Judge C6rdova who claims that the ICJ is incompetent both ratione personae
and ratione materiae in these cases, 1956 I.C.J. at 158 (dissenting opinion of Judge C6rdova).
120. See, e.g., 1956 I.C.J. at 109, 112 (separate opinion of Judge Klaestad) and 1982 I.C.J. at
439 (dissenting opinion of Judge Morozov).
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conspicuous way, a small revolution has taken place. It has affected,
to a considerable degree, the Court's role as the judicial organ of the
United Nations, as well as such issues as the position of individuals in
international law and the nature of internal law of international
organizations.
Some aspects of the Court's activity as an organ of appeal are out-
lined below. An attempt will be made to demonstrate how the ICJ has
managed to find a theoretical justification for the most profound
problems it has faced.
B. Jurisdiction of the Court
As mentioned above, none of the basic U.N. documents provide
for the possibility of review by the ICJ of judgments of administrative
tribunals. As Judge Winiarski rightly remarked, the review procedure
''was certainly not contemplated by the draftsmen of the Charter and
of the Statute."' 2' A proposal to that effect was put forward by Vene-
zuela at the San Francisco Conference, but was rejected. 122
The above notwithstanding, an appropriate procedure for revision
of administrative tribunal judgments was provided for with respect to
ILOAT and UNAT. The former's statute provides in Article XII that
whenever the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Governing
Body or the Administrative Board of the Pensions Fund challenges
the decision of ILOAT confirming its jurisdiction, or considers that a
decision of the Tribunal is vitiated by a fundamental procedural fault
followed, the question of the validity of the decision given by the Tri-
bunal shall be submitted by the Governing Body for an advisory opin-
ion to the ICJ. 123 Paragraph 2 of the provision explicitly provides that
the Court's opinion shall be binding.
Under Article 11 of the UNAT Statute, an advisory opinion may
121. 1956 I.C.J. at 106 (separate opinion of Judge Winiarski).
122. The proposal provided in relevant part: "[a]s a Court of Appeal, the Court will have
jurisdiction to take cognizance over such cases as are tried under original jurisdiction by interna-
tional administrative tribunals dependent upon the United Nations when the appeal would be
provided in the Statute of such Tribunals." Doc. WD 188, IV/1/24, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 482
(1945). Judge C6rdova concludes that the failure to adopt the amendment amounted to "an
advanced denial and clear rejection of all Requests for Advisory Opinions having the effect of an
appeal." 1956 I.C.J. at 161 (dissenting opinion of Judge C6rdova). See also Ostrihansky, supra
note 6, at 102, 104-05. The author points out that the proposed procedure was different from
that in the review UNAT and ILOAT judgments in that the former concerned the competence of
the ICJ in contentious cases, and was not intended to be of an advisory nature.
123. Keith believes that "[tIhis Article was doubtless accepted in this form to evade Article
34(1) of the Statute." KEITH, supra note 113, at 171. The Annex of the ILOAT Statute takes
into account cases when the dispute involves other organizations which have accepted ILOAT's
dispute resolution procedure. In those cases the Executive Boards concerned can request an
advisory opinion from the ICJ. However, this may create problems. See supra text accompany-
ing note 56.
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be requested on any of the following grounds: that the Tribunal has
exceeded its jurisdiction or competence, failed to exercise jurisdiction
vested in it, erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations, or has committed a fundamental error
in procedure which has occasioned a failure of justice. 124
It must be borne in mind that the procedure is provided for in
resolutions of international organizations, instruments which have no
binding force with regard to the ICJ.125 Thus, there arises a problem
of the legal basis of the Court's competence: Can the latter be broad-
ened and, if so, on what grounds? Can it be implied from the relevant
provisions of the U.N. Charter and the ICJ Statute, or does it flow
from a separate legal basis?
Judge C6rdova rejected any possibility of broadening the Court's
jurisdiction:
the jurisdiction of the Court derives entirely and exclusively from its
Statute, and no other international instrument, including the Statutes of
Administrative Tribunals or the resolutions of any Organ of the United
Nations, can introduce any modification with regard to the jurisdiction
of the Court; they cannot, in particular, either enlarge or diminish the
competence of the Court, as defined by the Statute, with regard to its two
legal activities, the judicial and the advisory functions. 126
However, the ICJ does not share these sentiments. The Court bases its
competence on two provisions: Article 96 of the U.N. Charter and
Article 65(2) of the ICJ Statute. 127
The relevant provisions of the statutes of both administrative tribu-
nals in fact constitute a limitation of the Court's jurisdiction. 128 The
ICJ has taken care not to exceed the grounds for review. In 1956 the
Court refused to deal with a question presented to it because it would
have required an analysis of "the reasons given by the Tribunal for its
decision on the merits of the question submitted to it,"' 129 which was
124. Thus, the grounds for objection with regard to UNAT are broader than with ILOAT.
125. "It is hardly necessary to comment upon the capacity or the right of the International
Labour Organisation--or as far as that is concerned, of the Assembly of the United Nations-to
impose upon the International Court of Justice obligations and new functions which are not
provided for in its Statute or in the Charter." Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the
International Labour Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 157 (Oct. 23) (dissenting opinion of
Judge C6rdova).
126. Id. at 156.
127. See, e.g., Application for Review of Judgement No. 33 of the United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18, 29-30 (May 27). In 1982 the Court also invoked Article 11 of
the UNAT Statute as a basis for its competence which was severely criticized by Judge Morozov.
See Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribu-
nal, 1982 I.C.J. 325, 349 (July 20); id. at 438 (dissenting opinion of Judge Morozov).
128. Ostrihansky, supra note 6, at 120; see also KEITH, supra note 113, at 76.
129. 1956 I.C.J. at 99.
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not contemplated by Article XII. The Court hinted, however, that it
would have had competence to answer the question had it been put in
reliance on UNESCO's general power to ask for an advisory opinion,
but the fact that it had been "expressly linked with Article XII" pre-
cluded the answer, since it was "outside that Article."' 30
Another problem arose when the Committee on Applications sub-
mitted a request for an advisory opinion formulated in general terms,
without specification of the grounds of the request. Fortunately, the
Committee had voted on two grounds during its meetings preceding
the request, which facilitated the Court's dilemma. The Court decided
to confine its reply to those grounds."' One wonders whether the
Court would have felt inclined to reject the request without this "legis-
lative history."
C. Nature of the Question
The U.N. Charter and the ICJ Statute impose a requirement that
the questions presented to the Court in advisory proceedings be legal
questions. In the 1956 opinion the Court asserted that
[t]he question put to the Court is a legal question. It arose within the
scope of the activities of Unesco when the Executive Board had to ex-
amine the measures to be taken as a result of the four Judgments .... In
submitting the Request for an Opinion the Executive Board was seeking
a clarification of the legal aspect of a matter with which it was
dealing. 132
This view is symptomatic of the Court's traditional jurisprudence. The
ICJ has been inclined to classify questions presented to it as "legal
questions" even in cases when law and politics are intertwined to a
considerable extent.
What is unusual in this procedure is that at the origin of the re-
quest is a dispute between an international organization and one of its
staff members. It has been argued that this is a way to circumvent the
prohibition of bringing disputes between subjects other than States
before the Court. 3 3 The ICJ itself has acknowledged that the proce-
dure is serving, "in a way, the object of an appeal" and that "[t]he
special feature of this procedure is that advisory proceedings take the
130. Id. For a discussion of the interrelation between Articles 96 of the UN Charter and
Article 65 of the ICJ Statute, on the one hand, and the specific provisions of the administrative
tribunal statutes, on the other hand, see Ostrihansky, supra note 6, at 105-06.
131. 1982 I.C.J. at 348-50; see also id. at 400-01 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
132. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation
Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 84 (Oct. 23).
133. See id. at 164 (dissenting opinion of Judge C6rdova).
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place of contentious proceedings which would not be possible under
the Statute of the Court." 134
Even the following comment, however, does not influence the
Court's readiness to reply to a request:
The existence, in the background, of a dispute the parties to which may
be affected as a consequence of the Court's opinion, does not change the
advisory nature of the Court's task, which is to answer the questions put
to it with regard to a judgment. 135
Gross makes a distinction with regard to the relevant provisions of
the statutes of ILOAT and UNAT respectively. In the author's opin-
ion, Article XII of the ILOAT Statute was designed as a means of
solving a conflict of competence between two organs of an interna-
tional organization, that is, as a means of determining whether the
Administrative Tribunal has acted ultra vires.136 Thus, the ICJ's role
here would not amount to rejudging the issue on the merits, but would
be confined to evaluating the limits of competence of the administra-
tive tribunal. Gross places a strong emphasis on the "distinction be-
tween an appeal having for its sole object the determination of the
competence of a tribunal and an appeal having for its object the deter-
mination whether a tribunal has correctly applied the law to the merits
of the dispute."' 37 It should, however, be noted that in the case of
UNAT, the additional objection found in Article 11 (that the Tribunal
"has erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of the Char-
ter of the United Nations") would require the Court's exercising a "ju-
dicial review, a true appellate jurisdiction."'' 3 8 In view of this
objection, it is difficult to agree that the ICJ's role is limited to
problems of competence between organs of international organiza-
tions. The underlying dispute is bound to have some effect on the
Court's analysis.
Another objection connected with the nature of the question,
raised by Judge Gros, is that "[t]he law applicable in the present case
134. Id. at 84, 85.
135. Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 171 (July 12); see also 1982 I.C.J. 333; Application for Review of
Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18, 30-31 (May
27). This is far from what Judge C6rdova would have agreed with: "One cannot think of this
case as being of two different natures, a contentious case before the Administrative Tribunal and
not a contentious one when it comes before the Court." 1956 I.C.J. 163 (dissenting opinion of
Judge C6rdova).
136. Gross, supra noie 7, at 33; see also Choi, supra note 6, at 356-58.
137. Gross, supra note 7, at 34. The author classifies the 1956 case as 'an "intra-organiza-
tional" dispute, where "one organ of UNESCO was at variance with the Administrative Tribunal
of the I.L.O. as to the question of competence." Id. at 35. The problem is discussed infra 11(4).
138. Gross, supra note 7, at 36; see DHARMA PRATAP, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 193-95 (1972).
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is not international law, which is the source of the jurisdiction con-
ferred upon the Court."' 139 It seems, however, that Judge Gros is in
error; it must be recognized that the internal law of international orga-
nizations forms part of international law. Problems concerning inter-
national servants are no less international than any others brought
before the ICJ in advisory proceedings, such as the problem of proce-
dural rules of the Security Council. 140 As has been mentioned, the ICJ
has admitted that administrative tribunals are "international tribu-
nals."' 4' It is fitting that international tribunals should hear disputes
about international law.
D. Scope of the Court's Review
As noted above, the grounds of review of judgments of the admin-
istrative tribunal are different in the case of ILOAT and UNAT, re-
spectively. Although with regard to UNAT, the challenges are
generally procedural in nature, "in an appropriate case, where the
judgment has been challenged on the ground of an error on a question
of law relating to the provisions of the Charter, the Court may ... be
called upon to review the actual substance of the decision." 142 As
Judge Oda observed, "the Court is expected in this case to function in
substance similarly to an appellate court vis-1-vis UNAT, to review
the actual substance of the Secretary General's decision and, if neces-
sary, to substitute its own opinion on the merits for that of UNAT."1
43
Even with regard to "simple" procedural questions the answer
might require an insight into the substance of the decision.44 This can
create serious doubts from the standpoint of the provisions of the U.N.
Charter and the ICJ Statute, for the borderline between the Court's
advisory and contentious jurisdiction becomes dangerously blurred.
Although the Court has always maintained that its task is not to
retry the case,' 45 in practice it has exercised freedom to go beyond the
139. 1973 I.C.J. at 257 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros); see also 1956 I.C.J. at 165-66
(dissenting opinion of Judge C6rdova). For a discussion of this issue, see Ostrihansky, supra note
6, at 110-12.
140. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Charter Art.
4), 1948 I.C.J. 57 (May 28).
141. 1956 I.C.J. at 97.
142. 1973 I.C.J. at 188. This actually was the case in the 1982 advisory opinion, which is
perhaps the reason why the opinion was accompanied by so many dissents, even from Judges
such as Judge Lachs who had appeared critical but sympathetic to the procedure in the 1973
advisory opinion. See also Gross, supra note 7, at 16.
143. Application for Review of Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18, 89 (May 27) (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
144. Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325, 435 (July 20) (dissenting opinion of Judge Morozov).
145. 1956 I.C.J. at 98-99; 1973 I.C.J. at 187; 1982 I.C.J. at 355-56; 1987 I.C.J. at 33-34. The
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express language of the decision of the administrative tribunal and of
the documents submitted to it: "The Court is not confined to an ex-
amination of the grounds of decision expressly invoked by the Tribu-
nal; it must reach its decision on grounds that it considers decisive
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal." t 46
In its 1973 opinion the ICJ admitted that "in appreciating whether
or not the Tribunal has failed to exercise relevant jurisdictional pow-
ers, the Court must have regard to the substance of the matter and not
merely the form."' 147 The Court "takes under its consideration all rel-
evant aspects of the proceedings before the Tribunal as well as all rele-
vant matters submitted to the Court itself by the staff member and by
the Secretary General."1 48
The Court acts in fact as if it were a true appellate body, confined
to the grounds of review, but free to take into account all external
factors which might have influenced the decision of the lower judicial
organ.
E. Binding Character of Advisory Opinions
Advisory opinions are, as a rule, merely of a recommendatory
character and have no mandatory effect. In this respect they differ
from judgments which impose on the parties an obligation to comply.
Despite this, it is not uncommon that some international instruments,
for instance the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations of 1946, provide that in case of a dispute and resort to
the ICJ, the latter's opinion shall be binding.1 49 A similar provision
appears in Article XII(2) of the ILOAT Statute.150
The Statute of UNAT does not state explicitly that the Court's
advisory opinion shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. Ac-
cording to Article 11(3) of the Statute, the Secretary General shall
either "give effect" to the opinion or shall request the Tribunal to con-
Court made this clear, especially with regard to ILOAT, when it explicitly stated that errors of
fact or law on the part of the Tribunal cannot give rise to the review procedure. 1956 I.C.J. at
87.
146. 1956 I.C.J. at 87.
147. 1973 I.C.J. at 189-90; see also id. at 235 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
148. Id. at 188.
149. See PRATAP, supra note 138, at 147-48. The author claims that "binding" opinions are
not an exception to the rule, because "the binding force is derived wholly from the agreement
between the parties, or from the relevant provision of the Constitution of the requesting body or
of the Statutes of the Administrative Tribunals." Id. at 228.
150: "The opinion given by the Court shall be binding." Statute of the International Labour
Organisation Administrative Tribunal, art. 12(2), adopted by the International Labour Confer-
ence on Oct. 9, 1946, reprinted in STATUTES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 8 (Bruno M. de Vuyst ed., 1981).
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vene in order to confirm its original judgment or give a new one in
conformity with the opinion. Gross comments that the text, "by offer-
ing several alternatives, avoids the automaticism of Article XII, at
least in a formal sense."' 51 The ultimate effect is, however, such that
an advisory opinion of the Court is binding on UNAT.
Although the Court has admitted that this effect goes "beyond the
scope attributed by the Charter and by the Statute of the Court to an
Advisory Opinion," 52 it has found the relevant provision of the
ILOAT Statute to be "nothing but a rule of conduct for the Executive
Board, a rule determining the action to be taken by it on the opinion of
the Court.' 53 Two considerations influenced the Court's conclusion.
First, the provision could in no way affect the way in which the Court
functioned; that continued to be determined by the Court's Statute
and Rules. Second, the provision did not affect the reasoning by
which the Court formed its opinion, or the content of the opinion
itself. ' 54
In its 1973 opinion the ICJ confirmed that the specific effect of an
advisory opinion cannot by itself constitute a sufficient reason for a
refusal to reply to a request. 55
F. Initiation of Review Proceedings
While several issues connected with the initiation of review pro-
ceedings have been briefly mentioned above when discussing the Com-
mittee on Applications of Review, other problems remain.
Under the ILOAT Statute, the request may be submitted to the
ICJ either by the Governing Body of ILO or by the Executive Board
of an international organization that has acceded to the ILOAT Stat-
ute. The Statute allows a basically unlimited accession of other orga-
nizations, open even to those unauthorized pursuant to Article 96(2)
of the U.N. Charter to request advisory opinions. Should the problem
arise, it is not clear how a request for an advisory opinion could be
made in cases involving those organizations. Pratap suggests the pos-
151. Gross, supra note 7, at 32. The author adds that the text, "far from weakening the
appellate character of the function of the Court, on the contrary strengthens it." Id. at 36.
152. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation
Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 8At (Oct. 23).
153. Id.
154. Id. According to Judge Winiarski, the binding character attributed to the opinion
"does not in itself affect the competence of the Court but constitutes further proof that what is
involved is an appeal in the form of a Request for an Advisory Opinion." Id. at 107,(separate
opinion of Judge Winiarski).
155. Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 182-83 (July 12).
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sibility of complying with Article 96(2) through the intermediary of
the ILO.156
Another difficulty, pointed out by Pratap, is connected with the
division of powers within a specialized agency. For example, the Rela-
tionship Agreement between the specialized agency and the United
Nations (required under Article 63 of the U.N. Charter) may author-
ize a different organ than that specified in the agency's constitution to
request advisory opinions. Such was the case with UNESCO, under
whose statute only the General Conference had this power. Therefore,
the Constitution had to be amended before the Executive Board could
request the 1956 advisory opinion. 157
As for UNAT, two organizations, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), have accepted its Statute. However, it is not clear whether
Article 11 of the UNAT Statute could apply to proceedings involving
those two organizations (the Statute is silent about organizations other
than the United Nations). Nevertheless, it seems that ICAO and IMO
should have access to the ICJ, be it pursuant to their general authori-
zation to request advisory opinions or according to the statutory pro-
cedure: "both organizations are empowered to request opinions on
legal questions arising within the scope of their activities, and disputes
with their staff are undoubtedly within that scope."' 158
The UNAT system of review was also criticized because it intro-
duced a political organ, the Committee on Applications for Review,
into an essentially judicial process. Judge Gros asserted that "one can-
not have a political committee, discretionary and secretive in opera-
tion, set up a hurdle, and at the same time claim to have provided
'machinery' for initiating a procedure of judicial review." 159 The ICJ
replied that there was "no necessary incompatibility" between the ex-
ercise of the screening functions by a political body and the require-
ments of a judicial process, "inasmuch as these functions merely
furnish a potential link between two procedures which are clearly judi-
cial in nature." 16
156. PRATAP, supra note 138, at 75. Keith believes that the basis of the Court's jurisdiction
in those cases could follow from Article 36, para. 1, of the ICJ Statute. KEITH, supra note 113,
at 41-44. Ostrihansky takes the stand that any attempt to request an advisory opinion by those
organizations should be rejected by the Court. Ostrihansky, supra note 6, at 107-08.
157. See PRATAP, supra note 138, at 75-76.
158. Ostrihansky, supra note 6, at 107.
159. 1973 I.C.J. at 263 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros).
160. Id. at 176. Ostrihansky notes that an intermediate body is necessary for enabling staff
members to have recourse to the Court. The author admits, however, that a procedure involving
a separate review organ would be more desirable. Ostrihansky, supra note 6, at 118.
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Moreover, as Judge de Castro has noted, other bodies of an "un-
doubtedly political character" (the General Assembly and the Security
Council) have the right to request opinions, and this is not considered
an obstacle from the point of view of the requirements of judicial
process. '61
In general, the Court is willing to accept any request coming from
an organ of the United Nations duly authorized under Article 96(2) of
the U.N. Charter. 62 The ICJ is ready to ignore any legal or political
controversies concerning that organ, as long as this basic condition is
satisfied.
Another imperfection, problematic with regard to the "require-
ments of the judicial process," can be traced in the UNAT review pro-
cedure. Under Article 11 of the UNAT Statute, an individual
Member State, not party to the proceedings, may object to a judgment
of UNAT. It was argued that this would not only impinge on the
rights of the Secretary General and conflict with Article 100 of the
U.N. Charter,' 63 but would also place the staff member in a position of
inequality before the Committee, especially if the Member State is a
member of the Committee at the time of the application. t64
In 1973 the ICJ seemed to indicate that this indeed would create a
troublesome situation. Although the Court at that time dismissed the
issue as being "without relevance to the present proceedings,",' 65 it re-
served the right to deal with it should there be an application of a
Member State in the future.
It so happened that the next application, which led to the 1982
advisory opinion, was made by the United States, a Member State also
a member'of the Committee. Despite its prior declaration, the ICJ
only reiterated its previous position that the procedure in general was
compatible with the U.N. Charter, the ICJ Statute, and the require-
ments of the judicial process, adding that this assessment did not de-
pend on whether the request for an advisory opinion had resulted from
the action of a staff member, a Member State, or the Committee it-
161. 1973 I.C.J. at 278 (separate opinion of Judge de Castro).
162. Id. at 175.
163. One contention is that the procedure enables every Member State to force the Secretary
General to delay the implementation of the Tribunal's judgments, this being incompatible with
his status as the "chief administrative officer of the Organization" and with the "exclusively
international character" of his responsibilities. The ICJ has rejected these arguments, under-
lining that the Secretary General is only obliged to suspend the implementation of the judgment
until it is confirmed or modified. This is a normal consequence of a review procedure. Applica-
tion for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982
I.C.J. 325, 337-38 (July 20).
164. Id. at 374-75 (separate opinion of Judge Ruda).
165. 1973 I.C.J. at 178. The application for review had come from a staff member.
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self.1 66 What was important for the Court was that the request had
emanated from the Committee; the origin of the application was
irrelevant. 167
G. Participation of Individuals in the Proceedings
The above subheading is to some extent misleading because ac-
cording to the letter of law, there can be no participation of individuals
in proceedings before the ICJ. However, it must not be ignored that in
cases concerning review of judgments of administrative tribunals, indi-
viduals are involved defacto. The issue already became relevant, indi-
rectly, in connection with the 1954 advisory opinion, but in that case
the ex-officials were not parties to the dispute.' 68
The Court is faced here with a dilemma. On the one hand, there is
a need to assure equality of the parties. According to Article 35(2) of
the ICJ Statute, this is one of the fundamental principles of the ICJ
system which "follows from the requirements of good administration
of justice."169 On the other hand, the ICJ Statute precludes participa-
tion of individuals before the Court. The problem then arises of how
to ensure the Court's access to all relevant documents and views, in-
cluding those of the officials involved.' 70 As the ICJ has noted, "the
judicial character of the Court requires that both sides directly affected
by these proceedings should be in a position to submit their views and
their arguments to the Court."' 17
As far as equality of the parties is concerned, one aspect of the
problem has already been mentioned in connection with the right of a
Member State to initiate proceedings before the Committee on Appli-
cations for Review. The problem, however, is not confined to the rela-
166. 1982 I.C.J. at 333. The Court acknowledged that Member States "may well have a legal
interest in giving rise to a review of the Judgment." Id. at 335. Ostrihansky suggests that "[t]he
right of a member-State to introduce an application for review to the Committee should be de-
rived from the functional character of the international legal personality of the Organization.
Being a subject of international law, an organization does not cease to be a forum articulating the
interests of the member-States." Ostrihansky, supra note 6, at 120.
167. 1982 I.C.J. at 335.
168. See KEITH, supra note 113, at 168.
169. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation
Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 86 (Oct. 23).
170. Under Article 66 of the ICJ Statute, only States and international organizations are
entitled to submit statements to the Court. Pratap remarks that where a request for an opinion
may directly concern the rights of individuals, the Court must, in order to do justice effectively,
provide them with the opportunity to submit their views. A different approach would constitute
a violation of the principle of audiatur et altera pars. PRATAP, supra note 138, at 188-89; see also
Brownlie, supra note 7, at 719; Choi, supra note 6, at 349-50.
171. 1956 I.C.J. at 86.
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tionship between an official and a State; above all, the staff member is
placed in a position of inequality with regard to the other party to the
dispute, the international organization.
The procedure is flawed by inequality at the outset in the cases of
the ILOAT and the ILO: only the international organization, through
its Executive Board in the case of the ILOAT or Governing Body in
the case of the ILO, has the right to submit a request for a binding
advisory opinion of the ICJ. Naturally, this is a serious disadvantage
for the staff member. It is hard to imagine that the organization, hav-
ing been successful in proceedings before ILOAT, will be willing to
refer the case to the ICJ. In fact, in the only previous case so brought
before the Court, ILOAT had ruled in favor of four applicants whose
contracts had not been renewed by the Director General of UNESCO.
In view of the above, it was contended that the Court was not com-
petent to reply to the 1956 request due to the lack of equality of the
parties and the fact that the "only means of securing equality" would
be to change the ICJ Statute. 72
The Court dismissed the objection on two principal grounds.
First, the inequality was not an inequality before the Court, but was
"antecedent to the examination of the question by the Court."'' 73 Sec-
ond, it did not affect the manner in which the ICJ undertook that
examination. 174 The Court asserted that judicial protection of officials
was its primary goal and that "[a]ny seeming or nominal absence of
equality ought not to be allowed to obscure or to defeat that primary
object."175
Moreover, one can argue that the mere fact of acceptance of the
request strengthens the principle of equality of the parties-especially
in cases where the decision of the administrative tribunal is unfavora-
ble to the staff member.
The absence of equality can, in the Court's opinion, be remedied by
the imposition of two requirements. The first is to ensure that the
officials can submit their views to the Court. The second is dispensing
with oral proceedings. 176
A precedent for the first condition was set up in the 1956 advisory
172. Id. at 168 (dissenting opinion of Judge C6rdova).
173. Id. at 85. The Court believed that the inequality was only "nominal" because the offi-
cials had been successful in the proceedings before ILOAT. Id. Judge Winiarski did not think
that the inequality constituted a "ban" to the rendering of the opinion, although it "added to" a
situation not compatible with the Court's judicial character. Id. at 108 (separate opinion of
Judge Winiarski).
174. Id. at 85.
175. Id. at 86.
176. Id.
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opinion when the views of the officials were transmitted through the
intermediary of UNESCO. Of course, this procedure makes the indi-
viduals concerned wholly dependent on the organization-their oppo-
nent in the proceedings. 177
In this regard, the procedural position of individuals is "more se-
cure"'178 in the case of UNAT than in the case of ILOAT. Under the
UNAT Statute the staff member is entitled not only to initiate pro-
ceedings which may lead to a request for an advisory opinion, but also
to have his views submitted to the Court by the Secretary General
without any control of the latter. This, however, does not by itself
solve the problem of equality of the parties before the ICJ.
Dispensing with oral proceedings also has its drawbacks. 179 One
can imagine that a State or an organization could submit at any time a
request for an oral hearing on the basis of Article 66(2) of the ICJ
Statute. This, as Judge Khan noted, would be tantamount to a veto on
the Court's right to reply.' 80 It places the Court in an uncomfortable
position of being dependent on a State's or international organization's
willingness to cooperate.181
Moreover, the Court itself might find it necessary to hold oral
hearings in order to clarify the views of the parties:
In such cases not to admit staff members to participate in cases involving
not merely questions of jurisdiction or fundamental errors in procedure
but also errors on questions of law relating to the provisions of the Char-
ter, might well present the Court with the dilemma of refusing the opin-
ion or of transgressing the principle of equality of the parties. 1
82
However, the Court does not seem concerned with the risks involved.
It considers the holding of public hearings "a matter within the discre-
tion of the Court," finding no special reasons for the interested parties
to have an opportunity to submit oral statements as long as other pos-
sibilities of presenting their views are at their disposal. 183 The Court is
177. Id. at 110 (separate opinion of Judge Klaestad).
178. Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 180 (July 12). Gross refers to it as "equality to a greater extent"
although he notes that the procedure still leaves something to be desired. Gross, supra note 7, at
30.
179. Oral proceedings have been referred to as "a normal and useful, if not an indispensable,
part" of the Court's proceedings. 1956 I.C.J. at 110 (separate opinion of Judge Klaestad). Judge
Gros considers oral statements "an indispensable condition for any proper investigation of the
case." 1973 I.C.J. at 265 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros).
180. 1956 I.C.J. at 114-15 (separate opinion of Judge Khan).
181. It is worth noting that the resolution adopting Article 11 of the UNAT Statute recom-
mended that Member States and the Secretary General refrain from making oral statements in
any proceedings under that Article. See 1973 I.C.J. at 180-81.
182. PRATAP, supra note 138, at 193.
183. 1973 I.C.J. at 181.
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only concerned to ensure that the interested parties shall have a fair and
equal opportunity to present their views to the Court respecting the
questions on which its opinion is requested and that the Court shall have
adequate information to enable it to administer justice in giving its
opinion. 184
Thus it seems that as long as the Court is satisfied that each side has
been given a de facto equal opportunity to make submissions, any
technical or legal inequality is not decisive. 185
H. Propriety of the Court's Reply
In view of all the above, even if the Court's competence is affirmed,
one may wonder whether the ICJ should reply to these types of re-
quests. There is no obligation on the part of the Court to do so; Arti-
cle 65 of the ICJ Statute gives the Court discretion in that regard.
However, so far the ICJ has not resorted to this possibility, despite
allegations that the effect of the procedure is to "render-in the guise
of an advisory opinion or advice-a true judgment, a real decision
binding those parties."'' 8 6
The Court has remained faithful to the principle that only "com-
pelling reasons" could preclude it from replying to a request for an
advisory opinion.' 8 7 Its attitude has been characterized as that of a
"duty to reply."' 8 The Court has emphasized that it could not refuse
to "lend its assistance in the solution of a problem confronting a spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations authorized to ask for an Advi-
sory Opinion of the Court,"' 8 9 or of the United Nations itself.
The "duty to reply" is strengthened by the "primary object" of the
established system of review which is the judicial protection of offi-
cials.190 It appears that the ICJ, being the primary judicial organ of
the United Nations, views its role as that of a guardian of the effective
functioning of the whole system.
184. Id. at 182.
185. KEITH, supra note 113, at 176.
186. Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation
Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 161 (Oct. 23) (dissenting opinion of Judge C6rdova); see also Gross, supra
note 7, at 25-26.
187. See 1956 I.C.J. at 86; 1973 I.C.J. at 183; Application for Review of Judgement No. 273
of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 325, 347 (July 20). In the latest
opinion the Court stated: "It is ... well established that the reply of the Court to a request for
opinion represents its participation in the activities of the United Nations and, in principle,
should not be refused." Application for Review of Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18, 31 (May 27).
188. KEITH, supra note 113, at 176.
189. 1956 I.C.J. at 86.
190. Id.
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Of course, doubts remain as to the propriety of the Court's assum-
ing this role. In Judge Gros's opinion, the Court should apply "two
essential principles for the examination of its own jurisdiction in each
review case that might be submitted to it." The first, and in his view
"hierarchically" superior principle, is the prohibition of "any en-
croachment on 'the requirements of good administration of justice',"
and the second principle is that only compelling reasons may cause the
Court to refuse "its collaboration in the working of a r6gime for the
judicial protection of officials."' 91
An analysis of the Court's jurisprudence shows that the second
consideration is more important. Not even serious procedural incon-
sistencies are sufficiently "compelling" to make the Court exercise its
discretion. 192
The Court is aware of the irregularities arising in the review proce-
dures. As the Court later described in its 1973 opinion, it had
a duty to ascertain whether the procedure in which it was called upon to
play an essential part was truly compatible with its task, its functions
and the ways they are to be discharged. That meant that it had to satisfy
itself that this system enabling Administrative Tribunal judgements to be
reviewed by the indirect means of an advisory opinion was compatible
with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the
Court, and with the requirements of the judicial process.' 93
The Court also confirmed that, in general, the procedure is com-
patible with the two basic instruments and the requirements of the
judicial process.' 94 As concerns the latter, the ICJ has stated that "the
compatibility or otherwise of any given system of review with the re-
quirements of the judicial process depends on the circumstances and
conditions of each particular system."' 95 In the case of both ILOAT
and UNAT, the ICJ found that the "circumstances and conditions" of
the established systems made the procedures satisfy the necessary
conditions.
The Court has other arguments, based on grounds of general pol-
icy, in favor of complying with requests brought in the course of the
review proceedings. One set of arguments is directed at the necessity
to ensure adequate protection for staff members through guarding the
effective functioning of the system of judicial review:
191. 1973 I.C.J. at 255 (dissenting opinion of Judge Gros).
192. For an example of a procedural irregularity the Court deems not compelling enough to
refuse its review, see discussion supra note 96.
193. Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1982 LC.J. 325, 333 (July 20).
194. See, e.g., 1973 I.C.J. at 177.
195. Id. at 176.
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A refusal by the Court to play its role in the system of judicial review set
up by the General Assembly would only have the consequence that this
system would not operate precisely in those cases in which the Commit-
tee has found that there is a substantial basis for the objections which
have been raised against a judgment.196
Other arguments revolve around the Court's task to "assist" the
United Nations and the need of "participation in the activities" of the
Organization. 97
The following passage from the 1982 advisory opinion reflects the
Court's policy:
The stability and efficiency of the international organizations, of which
the United Nations is the supreme example, are however of such para-
mount importance to world order, that the Court should not fail to assist
a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly in putting its
operation upon a firm and secure foundation. While it would have been
a compelling reason, making it inappropriate for the Court to entertain a
request, that its judicial role would be endangered or discredited, that is
not so in the present case, and the Court thus does not find that consider-
ations of judicial restraint should prevent it from rendering the advisory
opinion requested.' 98
CONCLUSION
The closing comments of this article necessarily concern the future
of the systems of review of UNAT and ILOAT judgments. It has been
repeated often-and the above remarks certainly underline-that the
review procedure is far from satisfactory. As the Court has put it dip-
lomatically, it is not "free from difficulty."'' 99 Suggestions for the fu-
ture go in two directions.
First, a uniformization of the two procedures is proposed. This
would eliminate the different and institutionally dependent position of
officials who work for the United Nations or the International Labour
Organisation, and would implement more fully the principle of equal
protection of all members of the international civil service.2 00 Fur-
thermore, harmonization of the procedures would facilitate the
Court's task in exercising the functions of an appellate tribunal. Sug-
196. Id. at 177.
197. Application for Review of Judgement No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18, 31 (May 27).
198. 1982 I.C.J. at 347.
199. 1973 I.C.J. at 183.
200. 1982 I.C.J. at 433 (dissenting opinion of Judge Lachs). Judge Lachs has from the outset
been an advocate of improvement and unification of the two separate procedures. See 1973 I.C.J.
at 214 (declaration of Judge Lachs); Manfred Lachs, Some Reflections on the Contribution of the
International Court of Justice to the Development of International Law, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& CoM. 239, 276-77 (1983).
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gestions of harmonization include a proposal to fuse the two tribunals
into one,201 which doubtlessly would contribute to the strengthening
of the system of judicial protection of officials.
Second, the above changes notwithstanding, a revision of the role
of the ICJ is necessary. Legal certainty requires that if the Court is to
exercise review functions in the future, this should be reflected in the
ICJ Statute. The time has probably come to reconsider the Venezue-
lan proposal from the San Francisco Conference. The idea of setting
up a separate chamber of the ICJ202 to exercise appellate functions
merits support. Also, statutory regulation of the position of individu-
als in proceedings before the ICJ is necessary.
If the Court's role as an appellate body is maintained, efforts
should be made to broaden its jurisdiction to cases arising before ad-
ministrative tribunals outside the United Nations system. Broadbent
v. OAS clearly demonstrated the need for some kind of review proce-
dure in the case of the Administrative Tribunal of the OAS.
The implementation of the above proposals would enhance the
Court's position as a true "World Court."
201. See, e.g., 1987 I.C.J. at 74-75 (separate opinion of Judge Lachs); id. at 76 (separate
opinion of Judge Elias); id. at 108-09 (separate opinion of Judge Ago); see also Paul Tavernier,
La fusion des Tribunaux Administratifs des Nations Unies et de I'O.I T: necessitd ou utopie?, 25
ANNUAIRE FRAN4;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 442 (1979).
202. In 1958 Gross had already suggested the establishment of a lower quorum or a special
chamber of five judges to handle such disputes. Gross, supra note 7, at 40; see also Ostrihansky,
supra note 6, at 121; Rudolf Ostrihansky, Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 37
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 30 (1988).
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